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Abstract 
A calculus of events is presented in which domain constraints, concurrent events, and 
events with nondeterministic effects can be represented. The paper offers a nonmonotonic 
solution to the frame problem for this formalism that combines two of the techniques 
developed for the situation calculus, namely causal and state-based minimisation. A 
theorem is presented which guarantees that temporal projection will not interfere with 
minimisation in this solution, even in domains with ramifications, concurrency, and 
nondeterminism. Finally, the paper shows how the formalism can be extended to cope with 
continuous change, whilst preserving the conditions for the theorem to apply. 
1. Introduction 
The frame problem was first described by McCarthy and Hayes in the Sixties 
[23], and has occupied the thoughts of AI researchers ever since. In a nutshell, 
the problem is this: if we deploy classical logic in a straightforward way to 
describe the effects of actions, we have to represent explicitly which properties 
are not affected by each action, as well as those that are. This is a problem 
because the number of properties that are not affected by an action tends to be 
huge in all but the most trivial domains.’ By the early Eighties, it was thought that 
the frame problem could be solved using the newly developed techniques of 
formal default reasoning (McCarthy [22]). However, Hanks and McDermott [8] 
demonstrated that the naive application of these techniques could lead to 
counter-intuitive results. Many authors, such as Lifschitz [13] and Shoham [37], 
* Telephone: +44 171589 5111. E-mail: rnps@doc.ic.ac.uk. 
1 A particularly clear description of the frame problem is to be found in McDermott [24]. 
0004-3702/95/$09.50 0 1995 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved 
SSDZ 0004-3702(94)00036-Z 
250 M. Shanahan I Artificial Intelligence 77 (1995) 249-284 
rose to the challenge of finding solutions that yielded correct conclusions with the 
examples that had undermined earlier attempts.’ 
By the end of the Eighties, the emphasis of research on the frame problem had 
shifted towards providing solutions which could deal with the features of complex 
domains. Baker [l], for example, addressed the issue of ramifications (which arise 
with domain constraints). Lin and Shoham [19], on the other hand, examined the 
problem of concurrent events. A complete solution to the frame problem is 
perhaps now within our grasp. However, a number of outstanding issues still need 
to be resolved, chief among which are actions with nondeterministic effects, that 
is actions whose precise effects are unknown, and continuous change. 
Besides focussing on the features of complex domains such as concurrency, 
nondeterminism and continuous change, current proposals for solving the frame 
problem are distinguished from their antecedents in another way. No longer is it 
considered acceptable to argue for the validity of a proposed solution using only a 
small number of benchmark examples, such as Hanks and McDermott’s Yale 
shooting scenario. Following Lifschitz [15], a proposal has to be mathematically 
justified for a substantial class of problems (see also Sandewall [32]). 
This paper offers a predicate-calculus-based formalism for representing and 
reasoning about change, which facilitates the representation of concurrent events 
and events with nondeterministic effects.” A nonmonotonic solution to the frame 
problem is given for this formalism, based on the idea of minimising the 
extensions of certain predicates using standard prioritised circumscription.4 The 
solution works for examples involving ramifications (domain constraints) and 
events with nondeterministic effects. A mathematical result is demonstrated 
which suggests that the solution has very general application. Another result is 
presented with facilitates the construction of temporal projection algorithms. 
Finally, the paper shows how to extend the formalism to cope with continuous 
change, whilst preserving the conditions of applicability of these mathematical 
results. 
Unlike most of the work cited in this introduction, the solution to the frame 
problem offered in this paper is not based on the situation calculus of McCarthy 
and Hayes [23]. Although some authors have offered hints and suggestions as to 
how continuous change could be formulated using the situation calculus (Gelfond 
’ Hanks and McDermott’s celebrated example has become known as the Yale shooting scenario. Some 
authors, such as Loui [20], questioned the assumptions underlying Hanks and McDermott’s analysis of 
this example. The task I set myself in the present paper is to address the frame problem. I will use the 
Yale shooting scenario simply as an example of where the frame problem arises. I am not interested in 
representing the Yale shooting scenario per se. 
’ I will not distinguish actions from events in this paper. 
’ A number of authors, notably Haas [7], Schubert [33], and Reiter [28], have proposed monotonic 
solutions to the frame problem for the situation calculus. Arguably, these solutions do not offer 
“elaboration-tolerance” (John McCarthy’s term), because the acquisition of new knowledge about the 
domain necessitates the complete reconstruction of the domain theory. The present paper supplies an 
elaboration-tolerant solution, in which new knowledge is automatically absorbed into the existing 
theory. 
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et al. [6]), it is not yet clear how this could be done. On the other hand, work 
already exists which extends the narrative-based event calculus of Kowalski and 
Sergot [ll] to deal with continuous change (Shanahan [35]), and this work, taken 
out of the framework of logic programming and augmented with a circumscriptive 
approach to default reasoning, is the basis of the formalism presented here. 
The ontology of Kowalski and Sergot’s formalism includes event types, time 
points and properties. Properties are initiated and terminated by events. In their 
formalism, once a property has been initiated, negation-as-failure is used to 
assume that it persists by default until an event occurs to terminate it, and this is 
how the frame problem is addressed. The calculus of events presented in this 
paper is similar in many respects.5 However, unlike Kowalski and Sergot’s 
formalism, which is expressed in extended Horn clauses and uses negation-as- 
failure, that presented here exploits the full expressive power of first-order 
predicate calculus, and therefore negation-as-failure cannot be relied on to supply 
a solution to the frame problem. The circumscriptive solution offered here takes 
advantage of the insights of several previous authors, whose work I will now 
briefly review. 
After Hanks and McDermott [8] discovered flaws in early efforts to overcome 
the frame problem, such as McCarthy’s [22], several authors developed more 
robust solutions, such as Lifschitz [12], Kautz [lo] and Shoham [37] who use 
chronological minimisation, Haugh [9] and Lifschitz [13] who use causal minimisa- 
tion, and Baker [l, 21, Baker and Ginsberg [3] and Lifschitz [15] who use 
state-based minimisation. The last two approaches, which were developed for the 
situation calculus, are based on the following simple observation. The Hanks- 
McDermott problem does not arise if temporal projection is independent of 
minimisationP This independence can be achieved by designing a formalism in 
which the frame problem can be overcome by minimising predicates whose 
extensions do not depend on the outcome of projection. In other words, 
minimisation can be separated from projection if the predicates to be minimised 
express timelessly true facts, rather than time-varying facts. For example, with 
causal minimisation, the predicates which are minimised express timelessly true 
facts about the effects of actions. 
The difficulty with this approach of separating minimisation from projection is 
to ensure that the formalism has sufficient expressive power to capture rich 
domains, whilst preserving the principle that the only predicates to be minimised 
express timelessly true facts. For example, the existing work using causal 
minimisation does not cope adequately with ramifications, as shown by Baker [l]. 
State-based minimisation handles ramifications much better (Baker [l]). With 
state-based minimisation, the predicates which are minimised express timelessly 
true facts about the abnormality of certain actions with respect to change. These 
facts are timelessly true because they are relativised to states, whose existence and 
5 In what follows, I will use the term “event calculus” to refer to the formalism presented here, not to 
Kowalski and Sergot’s formalism. 
6 This separation is also the basis of the more recent approach of Crawford and Etherington [4]. 
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properties are independent of temporal projection. The solution to the frame 
problem described here uses a hybrid of causal and state-based minimisation. 
The paper is organised as follows. The event calculus and the accompanying 
solution to the frame problem are presented in the next two sections, followed by 
a traditional Blocks World example of its use, without any proof of correctness. 
Then the mathematical properties of the formalism are investigated. Two results 
are developed: one which suggests that the frame problem is solved for a wide 
class of problems, and another to aid the construction of temporal projection 
algorithms. Further examples of the application of the formalism are then 
presented, which illustrate the use of these mathematical results. These include 
examples with ramifications and events with nondeterministic effects. Finally, the 
formalism is extended to cope with continuous change in a way which ensures that 
the mathematical results still apply. 
2. States 
I will use a many-sorted language of the first-order predicate calculus with 
equality, including variables for time points (t, f,, t2, . .), properties (p, p,, p2, 
q, ql, q2, . . .), states (s, s,, s?. .). truth values (u, ul, u?, . .), and truth 
elements (f, f, , f2, . . .). The domain of truth values has two members, denoted 
by the constants True and False. A pair ( p. u) is a truth element. The first part of 
the formalism to be presented concerns the properties of states. A state is 
represented as a set of truth elements. To capture this, the predicate E is defined 
as follows.’ 
s, =s2 t-, Vf[fEs, c-, f’Es,]. (S1) 
vs,,fl 3s2 Vf2 [J; Es, - [.fiEEs, " f2 =f,ll3 (S2) 
3SVf[lfES]. (S3) 
Axiom (Sl) says that two states are equal if they have the same truth elements. 
Axiom (S2) says that any truth element can be added to any state to give another 
state. Axioms (S2) and (S3) guarantee that a state exists for every combination of 
truth elements, and are analogous to the existence-of-situations axiom in Baker’s 
formulation [l, 21. The properties which hold in a given state are described by the 
predicate Holdsln. We have the following axioms. 
HoldsZn(p,s) + [ (p,True) ES A lAbState( , (El) 
lHofdsZn(p,s) + [( p,Fulse) Es A lAbState( . WI 
Axioms (Sl)-(S3) and (El) and (E2) will be part of the formalisation of any 
’ Throughout the paper, all variables are universally quantified unless otherwise indicated. 
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domain. If (p,True) Es, then the property p holds in state s. Conversely if 
(p,Fulse) Es, then the property p does not hold in state s. If (p,True)$s and 
(p,Fulse)$s, then, in the absence of further information about HoZMn, we 
cannot say whether or not the property p holds in state s. However, further 
information of this kind may be present in the form of domain constraints 
expressed as extra HoldsZn formulae. Such formulae can be admitted without 
giving rise to contradiction because of the AbStute conditions on (El) and (E2). 
The predicate Al&ate will be minimised, making axioms (El) and (E2) into 
defaults. Abnormal states are those ruled out by domain constraints. Baker’s 
approach adopts a similar tactic. 
Although there is no overall partitioning of properties into primitive and 
derived, the members of a set can be thought of as the primitive properties that 
hold/don’t hold in the corresponding state. Domain constraints in the form of 
extra Holdsln formulae can then be thought of as yielding “derived” properties. 
The presence of such domain constraints means that an event can have compli- 
cated ramifications, which must be dealt with by any approach to the frame 
problem. It is because of domain constraints and ramifications that states are 
represented by partial descriptions of the properties that hold in them, and (El) 
and (E2) cannot be replaced by a simple biconditional. Ramifications will be 
discussed in some detail in a later section. 
3. A calculus of events 
Now the main axiom of the formalism is presented in a form which is suitable 
for domains which involve only discrete change. Later, it will be modified to cater 
for the continuous case. The axiom defines the predicate State. The formula 
Stute(t,s) represents that time point t is associated with state s. Each time point is 
associated with a single, characterising state s,* such that (p,True) Es if and only 
if the property p was initiated by some event before t and still holds at C, and 
( p,FuZse) E s if and only if p was terminated by some event before t and still does 
not hold at t. The axiom we require is essentially the following. 
Stute(t,s) t, 
Vp [[(p,True) Es - Znitiuted(p,t)] A 
[(p,Fulse) Es ++ Terminuted(p,t)]]. 
In order to make the formalism easier to use, the final form of the axiom will 
facilitate the representation of the initial situation. But for now, let’s assume the 
above axiom, and consider the meaning of Initiated and Terminated. The 
formulae Znitiuted(p,t) and Terminuted(p,t) are not part of the language, but are 
’ In fact, this is not quite true. The improper use of domain constraints can lead to time points for 
which no corresponding state exists. Thus, State is a predicate rather than a function. 
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just abbreviations, which are defined as fol10ws.~ Several more predicates are 
introduced here. along with variables for the new sort of event types (e, e,, 
e2,. .). 
Znitiafed( p,fZ) fde, 
3e,t,,s [Huppens(e,t,) A f, <f, A Stute(t,,s) A 
Znitiutes(e,p,s) A iCfipped(t, ,p,f2)] . 
Terminated( p,f?) sdcf 
3e,t,.s [Huppens(e.t,) A t, <fl A Stute(t,,s) A 
Terminates(e,p,s) A lDeclipped(t, ,p&)] 
Again, the formulae Clipped(t,,p,t,) and Declipped(t,,p,t,) are not part of the 
language, but are abbreviations. which are defined as follows. 
Clipped(t, .p,r3) edC, 
3e,t2,s [Happens(e,tz) A t, < t2 A t, < f, A 
State(t,,s) A Terminutes(e,p,s)] 
Declipped(r, .p.f3) =dc, 
3e,f,,s [Huppens(e,l,) A t, ( t2 A t, A t, A 
Stutes(t,,s) A Zniciutes(e,p.s)] 
The formula Znitiutes(e,p,s) represents that, in state s, the property p is 
initiated by an event of type e, and the formula Terminute.s(e,p,s) represents that, 
in state s, the property p is terminated by an event of type e. The “causal” 
predicates Initiates and Terminates will be minimised. The formula Huppens(e,t) 
represents that an event of type e happens at time t. The formula t, <t, 
represents that time t, is before time t2. For the discrete case, time points can be 
interpreted by the naturals, and I will assume that we are considering only models 
in which < is interpreted accordingly.” 
To make it easy to represent the initial situation (the state at time 0), the 
predicate Initially is introduced. The formula Initially(p) represents that property 
p holds in the initial situation. Conversely, the formula ZnitiufZy(Not(p)) repre- 
sents that property ~1 does not hold in the initial situation. Note that ZnitiuZly will 
be minimised, although our knowledge of the initial situation might be incom- 
’ Because Initialed, Terminutc~d. Clipped and Declipped don‘t have the status of predicates, we don’t 
have to worry about them when designing circumscription policies. 
“I I will make several assumptions like this in the paper. The legitimacy of these manoeuvres depends 
on our ability, in principle. to till the resulting gap between model theory and proof theory to our 
satisfaction. For example. a second-order axiomatisation of the “<” predicate could be provided. 
From the point of view of computation, the existence of numerical algorithms and the possibility of 
procedural attachment is a source of comfort. 
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plete. The final form of the main axiom incorporates the Initially predicate as 
follows. Two further abbreviations are used to make the axiom clear. 
Stute(t,s) t) 
VP [[(p,True) Es - TrueAt(p,t)] A 
[ (p,FuZse) Es f-, F&eAt(p,t)]] . (E3) 
TrueAt( p,t) = def 
Znitiuted(p,t) v [Initially(p) A p = Not(p’) A -Clipped(O,p,t)] . 
FufseAt( p,t) =def 
Terminuted( p,t) v [Znitiully(Not(p)) A lDeclipped(O,p,t)] . 
It is important to note here that the state s which characterises a time t is not 
the set of uff properties that hold (or don’t hold) at t. Rather, s is a subset of those 
properties-the “primitive” ones. The presence of domain constraints, expressed 
in terms of Hofdsln, means that further “derived” properties might hold (or not 
hold) at t. The last axiom of the formalism defines the predicate HoldsAt, which 
takes into account this possibility. The formula HoldsAt(p,t) represents that 
property p holds at time t. 
HofdsAr( p,r) - Vs [Stute(t,s) A HoldsZn( p,s)] . PI 
The HofdsAt predicate is still not a complete description of which properties 
hold at what times, because there may be nondeterministic actions, or an 
incompletely described initial situation. However, it takes into account all that is 
known about each time point. In the rest of the paper, the conjunction of axioms 
(Sl)-(S3) with (El)-(E4) will be denoted by EC. In general, a temporal 
projection problem will be captured by the conjunction of EC with a conjunction 
of Happens and Initially formulae representing a history of events, and a 
conjunction of Initiates, Terminates and HoldsZn formulae representing the 
domain. The answer to the temporal projection problem resides in the set of 
HoldsAt formulae that are consequences. 
The frame problem is overcome using circumscription [21]. Circumscription 
works by minimising the extensions of certain predicates. To minimise the 
extension of a predicate is to insist that it contains only those objects it is forced 
to contain by the formula being circumscribed. The extensions of other predicates 
are optionally allowed to vary to accommodate this. We write CIRC[h ; P* ; Q*] 
to denote the circumscription of A, minimising P* and allowing Q* to vary, where 
P* and Q* are sets of predicates. If Q* is empty, this is sometimes written 
CZRC[A ; P*]. The circumscription of a formula is conventionally defined by a 
second-order sentence, but it can be equivalently presented in terms of minimal 
models. Consider two models M, and M,. We have 
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M, &*:e* M2 if 
l M, and M, agree on the interpretation of everything except P* 
and Q* 
l For allp in P*. the extension of p in M, C its extension in M2. 
Then, a model M of A is minimal with respect to 5 r*;y* if there is no model M’ 
of A such that M’II.. v* M and not M C p*,a,M’. A formula is true in 
CZRC[A ; P* ; Q*] ‘f 1 an ‘only if it is true in all models of A which are minimal d 
with respect to F Pa ,+*. This notion of circumscription can be extended to include 
the idea of mmimising certain predicates with a higher priority than others 
(Lifschitz [12]). Let PF , PT and Q* be sets of predicates. We write 
CIRC[A ; PT > PT ; Q*] to denote the circumscription of A, minimising Pr with a 
higher priority than PT. and allowing Q* to vary. Again, the conventional 
definition is via a second-order sentence. but this is equivalent to 
CZRC[A ; P; ; P; U Q*] A CZZ?C[A : P; ; Q*] . 
The exact choice of which predicates are minimised in a circumscription, the 
order in which they are minimised, and which predicates are allowed to vary, is 
called the circumscription policy. For a thorough review of the theory of 
circumscription, see Lifschitz [ 161. 
The circumscription policy for overcoming the frame problem, representing the 
assumptions that the only domain constraints are the known domain constraints, 
that the only events which occur are those which are known to occur, and that the 
only effects of events are the known effects, is to minimise AbState at a high 
priority, and to minimise Initially, Happens, Initiates and Terminates at a lower 
priority, allowing HoldsAt and State to vary. It is necessary to prioritise the 
minimisation of AbState in order to exclude models in which a larger than 
necessary extension of AbState is traded for a smaller than desired extension of 
Initiates or Terminates. The circumscription of a formula A according to this policy 
will be written CZRCJA]. 
4. The Blocks World 
Fortunately, the foregoing machinery is mostly transparent o anyone who uses 
the formalism, and descriptions of domains and histories are intuitive and elegant. 
In the next section, the mathematical properties of the event calculus are 
investigated, and a result is developed which supports the claim that the frame 
problem has been solved for a large class of examples. But first, I will show how 
the formalism could be used to represent a simple version of the Blocks World. 
The ontology of this world includes blocks and locations. A new sort is introduced 
for these, with variables x, y and _r.ll An event of type Move(x,y) is an attempt to 
‘I Blocks and locations should really have different sorts. but this would complicate the example. 
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move block x to location of block y. The property On(x,y) represents that block x 
is at location y or on block y. The domain of time points is assumed to be the 
natural numbers.” We have the following formulae. 
Znitiates(Move(x,y),On(x,y),s) t 
ZZoZdsZn(CZear(x) ,s) A ZZ&fsln(CZear( y),s) A n # y . 
Znitiutes(Move(x,y),Cleur(z),s) +- 
HoldsZn(Clear(x) ,s) A HoldsZn(CZear( y) ,s) A x # y A 
~ddd?Z(O~(X,Z),S) A y #Z . 
Terminutes(Move(x,y),On(x,z),s) +-- 
HoZdsZn(Cfeur(x) ,s) A HoldsZn(Cleur( y) ,s) A x # y A 
fk’h!Sh(O~(X,Z),S) A y # Z . 
Terminutes(Move(x, y) ,Cleur( y) ,s) + 
HoZdsZn(CZear(x) ,s) A HoZdsZn(Cleur( y) ,s) A x # y . 
The key feature of these formulae is that no mention is made of the HoldsAt 
predicate. No mention is made of actual times at all. Instead, the HoZdsZn 
predicate is used to give access to the properties that hold when an event occurs, 
by referring to the corresponding state. Because states are timeless, the formulae 
are timelessly true. This style of representation permits the vital separation of 
minimisation from temporal projection. 
Instead of explicitly specifying the conditions under which an event initiates or 
terminates the CZeur property, a domain constraint could be used. This would be 
achieved by writing ZZoZdsZn formulae which related the Clear property to the On 
property, and which constrained every block or location to have at most one 
block on it. 
For each domain, a set of uniqueness-of-names axioms is required for 
properties and event types. It might also be necessary to include other un- 
iqueness-of-names axioms, in this case for blocks and locations. I will not 
explicitly list these axioms in the examples in rest of the paper, but here is the full 
set of uniqueness-of-names axioms for this Blocks World domain, using Lifschitz’s 
UNA notation [13]. 
UNA[Move] . 
UNA [ Clear, On] . 
UNA[A,B,C,&,-&,X,l n 
A particular sequence of events or actions is described using Happens 
formulae. For example, the following formulae represent that block A is moved 
onto block B at time 5, then block C is moved onto location Xi at time 8. 
I2 The axioms of the event calculus do not depend on this assumption, and in Section 10 on continuous 
change, I will consider the case in which time points are interpreted by the reals. 
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Happens(Move(A,B),5) 
Huppens(Move(C,X, ),8) 
Concurrent events, such as moving two blocks at the same time, are easily 
represented as Happens formulae with identical time arguments, SO long as the 
events are independent, that is so long as their effects are not cumulative (like 
putting two weights on a pair of scales at the same time) or cancelling (like trying 
to lift an object and pressing down on it at the same time). In Section 9, a version 
of the calculus is described which can cope with cumulative and cancelling 
concurrent events. Note that it is easy to write formulae which represent events 
whose exact order of occurrence is not known, using disjunctions of Happens 
formulae, or using Happens formulae with existentially quantified time argu- 
ments. 
Suppose blocks A, B and c’ are initially clear and at locations X,, X, and X, 
respectively. Then we have: 
Initially(On(A ,X, )) . Initially(Clear(A)) . 
Initially(On(B,X,)) . Initially(Cleur(B)) , 
ZnitiaZly(On(C,X,) . Initially(Clear(C)) 
If the conjunction of all the above Initiates and Terminates formulae and 
uniqueness-of-names axioms is denoted by D, and the conjunction of the Happens 
and Znitially formulae by H, then in all models of CZRC,,[EC A D A H], we 
have, for example, HoldsAt(On(A,B),l2). I will not attempt to prove this here, 
but the results of the next section will provide a basis for proving which properties 
hold at what times for any domain and history. 
Intuitively, though, how has the frame problem been solved? Note that the only 
predicates needed to capture the Blocks World domain and to represent a history 
of events are Initiates, Terminates, HoldsIn, Happens and Initially. The cir- 
cumscription policy for overcoming the frame problem minimises only these 
domain and history predicates. The results of temporal projection, on the other 
hand, are expressed in terms of the predicate HoldsAt, which doesn’t appear in 
domain and history formulae. So, temporal projection is independent of minimi- 
sation. This has been achieved by using Holdsln in the representation of the 
domain, a predicate indexed on states. It would have been tempting to use 
HoldsAt instead, obviating the need for states altogether. But then the extensions 
of Znitiates and Terminates would vary according to the outcome of temporal 
projection. The strong result of the next section would not then be applicable, 
and the Hanks-McDermott problem would arise. 
5. Some properties of the calculus 
As Lifschitz points out [15]. we would like to be able to demonstrate that an 
approach to the frame problem yields correct results, not just with a single 
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example, but with a significant class of examples. General results of this sort have 
been produced for the situation calculus by Lifschitz [15] and Lin and Shoham 
[18], but neither of these papers addresses continuous change, concurrent events, 
or events with nondeterministic effects. Lin and Shoham have extended their 
work to deal with concurrent events [19], but the general result they prove is built 
on a criterion of epistemological completeness which apparently excludes the 
possibility of events with nondeterministic effects. 
In this section, I present a theorem which says that any collection of domain 
and history formulae of a certain form can be minimised independently from the 
axioms of the event calculus. The demands on the form of domain and history 
formulae are very liberal. Concurrent events are allowed, and in later sections I 
show that domains involving nondeterministic events and continuous change can 
also be represented in the required form. The theorem is very general, and 
applies not only to the calculus above, but also to any calculus having the right 
form. I will write x to denote a tuple of variables, and xi to denote the ith variable 
in such a tuple. 
Definition 1. A formula is chronological in argument k if it has the form 
Vx q(x) t-, 4(x), where q is a predicate whose kth argument is a time point and 
4(x) is a formula in which x is free, and all occurrences of q in 4(x) are in 
conjunctions of the form q(z) A z, <x,. 
For example, axiom (E3) is chronological in argument 1. Under certain 
conditions, it is easy to work out the consequences of circumscribing the 
conjunction of a formula with a chronological formula. 
Theorem 2. Consider only models in which the time points are interpreted by the 
naturals, and in which < is interpreted accordingly. Let P” and Q* be sets of 
predicates such that Q* includes q. Let 9 = Vx q(x) - #J(X) be a formula which is 
chronological in some argument. Let x be a formula which doesn’t mention the 
predicate q. Then 
CZRC[x A $ ; P” ; Q”] k CZRC[,y ; P* ; Q*] . 
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix A. Since both axioms (E3) and 
(E4) are chronological in one of their arguments, Theorem 2 ensures that any 
domain and history can be minimised independently from the event calculus 
axioms, so long as the domain and history formulae don’t mention HoldsAt or 
State. After this minimisation, the event calculus axioms can be used classically to 
derive which properties hold at what times. Appendix B contains another 
theorem, which facilitates the construction of temporal projection algorithms. 
It is important to see that meeting the conditions for applying Theorem 2 is not 
in itself sufficient to solve the frame problem. It is still necessary to get the 
minimisation right before (E3) and (E4) are added. Axioms (Sl)-(S3) and (El) 
and (E2) play a crucial role in this respect. Theorem 2 simply supplies certain 
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conditions under which projection is guaranteed not to interfere with minimisa- 
tion. This sort of interference is what gives rise to the Hanks-McDermott 
problem. 
In order to minimise domains and histories, two other properties of cir- 
cumscription will be useful. Theorems 3 and 4 are due to Lifschitz. They are 
reproduced here without proof, but proofs can be found in [16]. Let A be any 
formula and 6(x) be any formula in which x is free. 
Theorem 3. CIRC[A A Vx p(x) +-6(x) ; p] is equivalent to A A Vx p(x) - 6(x) 
if A and 6(x) are formulae containing no occurrences of the predicate p. 
Theorem 4. If all occurrences of fhe predicates p, , pZ, . . . , p, in .a formula A are 
positive, then CIRC[A ; P*], where P* = {p,, p?, . , p,}, is equivalenr to 
CZRC[A ; p,] A CZRC[A ; p2] A . . A CIRC[A ; p,] 
6. The Yale shooting problem 
With the results above, it’s easy to show that the event calculus can solve the 
Yale shooting problem [8]. The domain comprises three types of event--load, 
Sneeze and Shoot-and two properties--Alive and Loaded. These events and 
properties are represented by the following formulae, whose conjunction along 
with the requisite uniqueness-of-names axioms will be denoted by D,. Note that 
there are no axioms for the Sneeze event, since it doesn’t affect any property. 
Initiates(Load,Loaded,s) (D1.l) 
Terminates(Shoot,Alive,s) t HoldsZn(Loaded,s) (D1.2) 
The Yale shooting scenario can be represented by the following history 
formulae, whose conjunction will be denoted by H,, describing three events- 
Load then Sneeze then Shoot. The Sneeze event substitutes for the Wait action of 
the original Yale shooting scenario. Using the event calculus, waiting is most 
naturally represented simply as a pause between events, rather than as an event 
which has no effect. The Sneeze event here serves the same purpose as waiting in 
the original formulation: it provides an opportunity for the minimisation to go 
wrong. 
Initially(Alive) . (H1.3) 
Happens(Load, 10) . (H1.2) 
Happens(Sneeze,lS) . (H1.3) 
Happens(Shoot,20) . (H1.4) 
Proposition 5. CIRCJEC A D, A H,] /= lHoldsAt(Alive,25). 
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Proof. Let x be the conjunction of D, with H, and EC without (E3) and (E4). 
CIRCJxJ is defined as the conjunction of 
CZRC[x ; Initially, Happens, Initiates, Terminates ; State, HoldsAt] 
with 
CZRC[x ; AbState ; 
Znitially , Happens, Initiates, Terminates, State, HoldsAt] . 
We will consider each conjunct in turn. 
Take the first conjunct. Since all occurrences of Happens, Initiates and 
Terminates in x are positive, 
CZRC[x ; Znitially, Happens, Initiates, Terminates] 
is equivalent to 
CZRC( x ; Initially) A CZRC[x ; Happens] A 
CZRC[x ; Initiates] A CZRC[x ; Terminates] 
from Theorem 4. Then, by applying Theorem 3, to each conjunct in this formula, 
it can be seen that the completions of Happens, Initiates and Terminates are true 
in all of its models. In particular, we have the following. 
Terminates(e,p,s) - 
e = Shoot A p = Alive A HoldsZn(Loaded,s) . 
Happens(e,t) - 
(1) 
[e = Load A t = lo] v [e =Sneeze A t = 151 v 
[e =Shoot A t = 201. (2) 
Since there are no occurrences of State or HoldsAt in ,Y, (1) and (2) are also true 
in all models of CZRC,,[x], where these predicates are allowed to vary. 
Now let’s look at the second conjunct of CZRC,,[x]. Without any domain 
constraints in D,, the only abnormal combinations of truth elements are those 
which include both (p,False) and (p,True) for some p. So, in all models of 
CZRC[x ; AbState ; Happens, Initiates, Terminates] we have 
AbState(s) - 3p [(p,False) Es A (p,True) ES]. (3) 
Since there are no occurrences of State or HoldsAt in ,y, allowing these predicates 
to vary does not affect the outcome of the circumscription, so (3) is also true in all 
models of CZRC,,[x]. 
Now, since (E3) and (E4) are chronological, by applying Theorem 2, first to 
add (E3) and then to add (E4), we can show that (l), (2) and (3) are also true in 
all models of CZRCJEC A D, A H,]. 
The combination of (3) with axioms (S2), (S3) and (El) ensures that every 
model includes a state in which Alive and Loaded hold. Given this, along with 
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(l), (2) and (3), it’s easy to show ciassically from D, and H, that in all models of 
the circumscription we have 
3s [Scate(2O,s) A HoldsZn(Alive,s) A HoldsZn(Loaded,s)] 
and therefore, 
3s [State(25,s) A lHofdsfn(Alive,s)] 
and lHoZdsAt(Alive,25). Cl 
7. Ramifications 
Domain constraints can be expressed as Hold&z formulae. For example, the 
property Dead can be defined in the following way. 
HoldsZn(Dead,s) - lHofdsln(Alive,s) . (D1.3) 
Let D; denote the conjunction of (Dl .l)-(D1.3) with the requisite uniqueness- 
of-names axioms. 
Proposition 6. 
CZRCJEC A D; A H,] t= 
HoldsAt(Afive,20) A HoldsAt(Dead,25) 
Proof. The addition of (D1.3) does not substantially affect the proof for 
Proposition 5. Instead of (3) we have, 
AbSface( f,s) ++ 
3p[ (p,False) Es A ( p.True) f s] v 
[(Alive,True) ES A (Dead,True) E.S] v 
[ ( AliveJalse) E s A (Dead,False) Es] . 
Every model still includes a state in which Alive and Loaded hold. But we also 
get 
3s [State(ZS,s) A Holdsln(Dead,s)] 
and therefore HoldsAt(Dead,25). 0 
Here we will only look at simple examples. But in general, a domain constraint 
could be any formula involving just the HoZdsZn predicate in which the only 
situation term is a universally quantified variable. In addition, a domain constraint 
could involve any predicate apart from HoldsAt, Initiates, Terminates, Initially, 
and State. For example, to formalise a problem involving a chess board in the next 
section, I will introduce two predicates Black and White to be used in domain 
constraints. 
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Note that (D1.3) doesn’t ensure that an event which initiates Dead also 
terminates Alive. A property that holds because it was initiated by an event, can 
only be terminated directly by an event, and not by an event which terminates a 
property on which it depends. What this amounts to is that a property which is 
initiated by an event must be considered as primitive until it is terminated. 
This principle can be illustrated by introducing a new property Walking, and a 
further constraint that if Walking holds then Alive must hold (Baker [2]).13 The 
obvious way to try to represent this is with a ZZoZdsZn formula. 
HoldsZn( Walking,s) ---, HoldsZn(AZive, s) . (D1.4) 
However, this formula only yields intuitive conclusions under certain circum- 
stances. With the addition of (D1.4), we can show lHoldsAt(Wulking,25). But 
suppose we add a new event type Walk and the following additional domain and 
history axioms. 
Znitiates(Walk,Walking,s) . (D1.5) 
Happens( Walk,S) . (H1.5) 
Let 0’; be the conjunction of (Dl.l), (D1.2), (D1.4) and (D1.5) with the 
requisite uniqueness-of-names axioms. Let HI be HI A (H1.5). Do we still have 
1HoZdsAt(Walking,25) in all models of CZRC,,[EC A 0; A Hi]? From axiom 
(E3), we get 
Stute(25,s) + [ (Alive,Fulse) ES A (Wulking,True) ES] . 
Therefore, from (D1.4) (El) and (E2), we have 
Stute(25,s) + Al&ate(s) . 
So we can no longer deduce anything interesting about time 25. A better way to 
represent a domain constraint like (D1.4) is to use Initiates and Terminates. This 
preserves the principle that a property which is initiated directly by an event must 
also be terminated directly by an event. 
Terminates(e,Walking,s) t Terminates(e,Alive,s) . (D1.6) 
Both (D1.4) and (D1.6) can be present in the same domain theory. Axiom 
(D1.4) would be used to deduce that Alive holds when Walking holds, given an 
event that initiates Walking but none that initiates Alive, and axiom (D1.6) would 
be used to deduce that Walking does not hold after an event that terminates 
Alive. Let 0; be the conjunction of (D1.1) (D1.2) (D1.5) and (D1.6) with the 
requisite uniqueness-of-names axioms. 
Proposition 7. CIRC,,[h] k lHoldsAt(WuZking,25), where A is EC A 0: A 
HI. 
I3 This variant of the Yale shooting scenario is sometimes called the “walking turkey shoot”. 
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Proof. Theorem 2 is applied in the usual way. CZZ?C,,[A] yields (3) as in the proof 
of Proposition 5, but instead of (1) and (2), CZRC,,[h] now gives 
Terminates(e,p,s) - 
[e = Shoot A p = Alive A Holdsln(Loaded,s)] v 
[e = Shoot A p = Walking A Holdsln(Loaded,s)] , (4) 
Happens(e,t) f-, 
[e = Walk A t = 51 v [e = Load A t = lo] v 
[e = Sneeze A t = 151 v [e = Shoot A t = 201 . (5) 
From (3), (4) and (5), it’s easy to show classically that lHoldsAt(Walking,25). 
0 
8. Nondeterministic effects 
The separation of temporal projection and minimisation permitted by Theorem 
2 allows us to represent events whose effects are nondeterministic, knowing that 
this will not precipitate problems with temporal projection. Examples of events 
with nondeterministic effects are those which initiate a disjunction of properties 
or a property which is existentially quantified. Consider the following problem, 
due to Ray Reiter.14 The action of moving an object onto a chess board either 
initiates the property that the object is on black, or the property that it is on 
white, or both properties at once (if it straddles two squares). 
Can the effects of such an action be represented in the event calculus, whilst 
preserving the conditions for applying Theorem 2? There is a danger that 
minimising the effects of moving an object onto the board will exclude the 
possibility of moving it to a position where it is on both black and white, since 
such an action would initiate two properties when it could have initiated only one. 
The circumscription should allow at least one model in which such an action 
initiates both properties. Also, it is important to exclude models in which the 
object, once moved onto the board, flickers between black and white. If it is 
moved onto a particular location on the board, then it should stay there until it is 
moved again. 
Events with nondeterministic effects, such as the one in this problem, can often 
be represented as initiating an intermediate property, which has nondeterministic 
ramifications. This is the approach taken in the following solution. The variable c 
is introduced for locations. A location is either black, white or mixed. There is 
one event type Move. The property Lot(c) represents that the object is at 
location c. There are two other properties: OnBlack and OnWhite. 
I4 Personal communication 
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Vs 3c [Znitiates(Move,Z_.oc(c),s)] . 
Vc [Black(c) v White(c) v Mixed(c)] . 
Black(c) - 
vs [Hofdszn(Loc(c),s) + 
HoldsZn(OnBlack,s) A lHoldsZn(OnWhite,s)] . 
White(c) - 
Vs [HoZdsZn(Loc(c),s) + 
HoldsZn(OnWhite,s) A lHoldsZn(OnBlack,s)]. 
265 
(D2.1) 
(D2.2) 
(D2.3) 
(D2.4) 
Mixed(c) ++ 
Vs [HoldsZn(Loc(c),s) -+ 
HoldsZn(OnWhite,s) A HoldsZn(OnBlack,s)] . (D2.5) 
It is easy to see that minimising Initiates does not affect HoldsZn, since HoldsZn 
is held fixed. Nor is HoldsZn affected by temporal projection (Lemma A.22, in 
Appendix A guarantees that if there is a model of (D2.1)-(D2.5) in which there 
is a state s such that HoldsZn(OnBluck,s) A HoldsZn(OnWhite,s), then there will 
be such a model of EC conjoined with (D2,1)-(D2.5).) So, without further 
domain constraints, it will not be possible to show that 
lHoldsAt(OnBlack,t) v lHoldsAt(OnWhite,t) 
for any time t after a Move event, unless there is another event between the Move 
event and t which terminates Lot(c). In other words, there will always be a model 
in which the object is both on black and on white after it is put on the chess 
board, which is the result we require. 
One further complication arises with events whose effects are nondeterministic. 
As things stand, within any given model, the same event will always have the 
same effect when the same fluents hold, even though that effect can be different 
in different models. One way around this problem is to omit axiom (Sl), which 
identifies states with the fluents that hold in them, and add an axiom which insists 
that there is at most one state for each time point. With a larger space of possible 
states for each time point, models can exist in which the same event has a 
different outcome at two different time points, even though exactly the same 
fluents hold. 
9. Concurrent events 
A simple modification to the event calculus axioms, which I will describe in this 
section, permits the representation of concurrent events whose effects are 
cumulative or cancelling. Two or more events are cumulative if their simultaneous 
occurrence has effects that none of them has on its own. One event cancels the 
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effect of another if their simultaneous occurrence prevents the second event from 
having an effect which it does have if it occurs on its own. It should be noted that, 
as with the suggestions in the previous section, none of the amendments I propose 
affects the applicability of Theorem 2, as axioms (E3) and (E4) will remain 
chronological. 
With the present axioms, it is possible to represent the simultaneous occurrence 
of two events, but not the fact that their effects are in any way dependent on each 
other. Let’s see this with an example. Suppose we want to formalise the 
following. If we push a supermarket rolley then it will move forwards. If we pull 
on it it will go backwards. But if we push on it at the same time as pulling on it, 
then it will spin around. The first two facts are easily represented by the following 
event calculus formulae. 
Initiates(Push,Forwards,s) 
Terminates(Push,Backwards,s) . 
Initiates(Pull,Backwards,s) . 
Terminates(Pull,Forwards,s) . 
Suppose we push the trolley at time 5 and then pull it at time 10. 
Happens(Push,S) . 
Happens(Pull,lO) 
If the conjunction of the above Initiates and Terminates formulae with the 
requisite uniqueness-of-names axioms is denoted by D,, and the conjunction of 
the Happens formulae by H3, then in all models of CIRCJEC A D, A H3] we 
have, for example, HoldsAt(Forwards,7) and Hola!sAt(Backwards,l2). Now 
consider what happens if we try to represent the additional information that we 
pull the trolley at time 5 as well as pushing it, and that we push the trolley at time 
10 as well as pulling it. 
Happens(Pull,S) . 
Happens(Push,lS) 
If we denote the conjunction of H3 with these formulae by Hi, then in all 
models of CZRCJEC A D, A Hi], we still have HoldsAt(Forwards,7) and 
HoldsAt(Backwards,12). How can we represent the fact that simultaneously 
pushing and pulling on the trolley makes it spin around instead of moving either 
forwards or backwards? Two steps are required. First, we need to be able to write 
Initiates and Terminates formulae which describe the effect of two or more events 
occurring together. Then we need to be able to express the fact that one event can 
cancel the effect of another occurring at the same time. To achieve the first aim, 
an extra axiom is introduced, along with the infix function + which maps a pair of 
event types onto a third event type. A compound event of type e, + e2 happens if 
events of type e, and e2 happen concurrently. 
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Happens(e, + e,,t) + 
Huppem(e,,t) A Happens(e,,t) h e, Ze, . (E5) 
Note that this axiom will accumulate any number of concurrent events into a 
single event type.” Now, to represent the cumulative effect of two concurrent 
events, it is only necessary to write the appropriate Initiates and Terminates 
formulae in the usual manner. For the supermarket rolley example, the following 
extra Initiates and Terminates formulae will suffice. 
Initiates(Push + Pull,Spinning,s) . 
Terminates(Push + Pull,Forwards,s) . 
Terminates(Push + Pull,Backwards,s) . 
For completeness there should be two further formulae representing the fact 
that Push and Pull each terminate Spinning. Now we will get the desired 
cumulative effect of both events, but we will still retain the unwanted previous 
conclusions about their individual effects. To overcome this problem, following 
Gelfond et al. [6] and Lin and Shoham [19], I will introduce a new predicate 
Cancels. The formula Cancels(e,,e,) represents that if an event of type e, occurs 
then it cancels the effects of any event of type e2 occurring at the same time. Now 
we have to modify the definitions of Initiated and Terminated to take account of 
Cancels. 
Znitiated( p,t2) = def 
3e,t,,s [Huppens(e,t,) A t, < t, A Stute(t,,s) A 
Znitiates(e,p,s) A lClipped(t, ,p,t2) A lCancelZed(e,t,)] . 
Terminated(p,t,) zddef 
3e,t,,s [Happens(e,t,) A t, < t, A State(t,,s) h 
Terminates(e,p,s) A lDeclipped(t, ,p,t2) A 
1CancelZed(e,t,)] . 
CunceZfed(e, ,t)Eddef 3e, [Huppens(e, ,t) A Cuncels(e,,e,)] . 
Similar modifications are required for Clipped and Declipped. 
3e,t2,s [Huppens(e,t,) A t, <t, A t, <t, A 
Stute(t, ,s) A Terminates(e,p,s) A lCancelZed(e,t,)] . 
I5 Axioms for the associativity and commutativity of the “+” operator are unnecessary. 
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3e,tz,s [Happens(e.t,) A t, < t2 A t, < t, A 
State(t,,s) A Znitiates(e,p,s) A lCancefled(e,t,)] . 
Finally, Cancels must be minimised at the same priority as Happens, Initiates 
and Terminates, representing the assumption that events don’t cancel each other’s 
effects unless they are known to. It is interesting to note that there is no need for 
an axiom to ensure that a compound event inherits the effects of its component 
events, as required in the approach of Lin and Shoham [19]. Instead, a history of 
events is described entirely in terms of the separate occurrences of individual 
events, even if they are concurrent. Cancellation formulae may now be included 
in the description of a domain. To complete the supermarket trolley example, we 
have to add the following. 
Cancels(Push, Pull) . 
Cancels(Pull,Push) 
If we denote the conjunction of the modified event calculus axioms by EC’ and 
the conjunction of D, with the extra domain formulae by DA, then in all models 
of the circumscription of EC’ A 0; A H_; according to the above policy, we 
have lHoldsAt(Forward.s,7) and lHoldsAt(Backwards,l2) as well as 
HoEdsAt(Spinning,7) and HofdsAt(Spinning,l2). 
10. Continuous change 
This section extends the event calculus of Section 3 to deal with continuous as 
well as discrete change, as in Shanahan [35]. This is achieved through the 
introduction of two new predicates. Variables for elapsed time are introduced (a, 
a,, a>, . . .). The formula Trajectory(q,s,p,a) represents that, if the discrete 
property 9 is initiated in state s, then after a period of time a the continuous 
property p holds. For example, property 9 could be that a ball is moving at a 
certain velocity and property p could be that the ball has travelled a certain 
distance from its starting point. 
The Trajectory predicate facilitates the representation of continuous change, 
such as the height of a falling object or the level of liquid in a filling vessel, but 
doesn’t supply any means of representing that events occur when certain 
continuous properties hold. For example, when the level of liquid in a vessel 
reaches the vessel’s rim, then an overflow event occurs. A second new predicate is 
introduced for this purpose. The formula Triggers(s,e) represents that an event of 
type e happens in state s. 
There are now two ways in which a property can be caused directly by an event. 
I will write Znitiated,(p,t) to represent that the discrete property p holds at time t 
and was initiated by an event, and Znitiated,(p,t) to represent that the continuous- 
ly varying property p holds at time r and was initiated by an event. The same 
M. Shanahan i Artificial Intelligence 77 (1995) 249-284 269 
property can be continuous at some times and discrete at others. The location of a 
ball, for instance, can be considered continuous while the ball is moving but 
discrete while it’s stationary. We have the following replacement definitions for 
Initiated. 
Initiated,(p,t,)-,,, 
3t,,e,s [tl < t, A State(t,,s) A 
[Happens(e,t,) v Triggers(s,e)] A 
Znitiates(e,p,s) A lClipped(t,,p,t,)] . 
Znitiated,(p,t,)=,,, 
3t,,e,s,q [tl < t, A State(t,,s) A 
[Happens v Triggers(s,e)] A 
hitiates(e,q,s) A iClipped(t,,q,t,) A 
a = t, -t, A Trajectory(q,s,p,a)] .
Initiated(p,t)=,,,lnitiated,(p,t) v Initiated,(p,t) . 
The rest of the definitions of Section 3 are modified to cope with Triggers, but 
are otherwise the same as before. 
C@N(fl,P,t3)=def 
3e,t2,s [tl <t, A t, < t, A State(t,,s) A Terminates(e,p,s) A 
[Happens(e,t,) v Triggers(s,e)]] . 
3e,t,,s [tl <t, A t, < 1, h State(t,,s) A Znitiates(e,p,s) A 
[Happens(e,t,) v Triggers(s,e)]] . 
Terminated(p,t,)=,,, 
3e,t,,s [tl < t, A State(t,,s) A 
[Happens(e,t,) v Triggers(s,e)] v 
Terminates(e,p,s) A lDeclipped(t, ,p,&)] . 
Apart from these modifications, the axioms of EC are retained from Section 3. 
The circumscription policy to overcome the frame problem is to minimise A&State 
with high priority, then Trajectory, Triggers, Initially, Happens, Initiates and 
Terminates, allowing HoldsAt and State to vary. Given a formula A, I will write 
CZRC,,,[h] to denote its circumscription according to this policy. 
The statement of Theorem 2 and its proof in Appendix A assume that time 
points are interpreted by the natural numbers. To accommodate genuinely 
continuous change, time points need to be interpreted by the reals. A variant of 
Theorem 2 can be proved when time points are interpreted by the reals, but the 
proof is more complicated that that for the naturals. Also, a certain condition 
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must hold. Intuitively, this condition states that it must be possible to map the 
real time line onto a well-founded structure (known as a marker set) in such a 
way that the recursive formula VX q(x) * 4(x) is also well-founded with respect 
to that structure. In the case of the event calculus axioms, this structure is the set 
of time points at which events occur. This condition clearly holds, for example, if 
there is a finite number of events. 
Shortly I will illustrate the use of the axioms presented above with an example, 
but first I will present the extended version of Theorem 2. 
Definition 8. A marker set is a subset S of R such that, for all T, in R, the set of 
T, in S such that T, < T, is finite. 
From the definition, a marker set can be finite or infinite, but must be 
countable. Furthermore, the definition ensures that we can speak of the nth 
element of a marker set and that this will be less than the (n + 1)th element. 
Definition 9. A formula Cc, is real-chronological in argument k with respect to a 
formula x and a marker set S if 
(a) It has the form VX q(x) t, 4(x), where q is a predicate whose kth 
argument is a time point and @$) is a formula in which x is free, and 
(b) All occurrences of q in 4(x) are in conjunctions of the form q(z) A 
zk <xk A 8, where x A $ k 10 if zk,&S. 
Under the right conditions, axiom (E3) will be real-chronological in argument 1 
with respect to a conjunction of domain and history formulae and a marker set 
corresponding to the set of time points at which events (including triggered 
events) occur. 
Theorem 10. Consider only models in which the time points are interpreted by the 
reals, and in which < is interpreted accordingly. Let P* and Q* be sets of 
predicates such that Q* includes q. Let 4 = Vx q(x) t, 4(x) be a formula which is 
real-chronological in some argument with respect to a formula x which doesn’t 
mention the predicate q, and a marker set S. Then 
CIRC[x A Ic, ; P* ; Q*] /= CZRC[x ; P* ; Q*] 
The proof of Theorem 10 is given in Appendix C. Now let x be the conjunction 
of a domain formula and a history formula with EC, but without (E3) and (E4). 
Let S be the set of time points at which events occur according to (E3) A x. It 
can be seen that (E3) is real-chronological in argument 1 with respect to x and S, 
so long as S is a marker set. So Theorem 10 can be used in exactly the same way 
as Theorem 2 to add (E3) and (E4) to a circumscribed x without affecting the 
minimisation. 
Under what circumstances does S constitute a marker set? Here are some 
examples. It is clear that S is a market set if there is a finite number of events. It 
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can easily be shown that it is also a marker set if there exists a smallest non-zero 
interval size between any two non-concurrent events. On the other hand, S is 
clearly not a market set if an event occurs at every time point in the infinite series 
0, 3, i, $, A, and so on. Examples of this kind actually do arise, as in the 
idealised description of a bouncing ball (see Davis [5]), and the proof might be 
generalised to cope with these cases using transfinite induction. 
To illustrate this approach to the representation of continuous change, I will 
formalise Sandewall’s “ball and shaft” example (Sandewall [29]). A ball is moving 
horizontally along a surface towards a vertical shaft. When it reaches the shaft, it 
starts to fall, bouncing back and forth between the walls of the shaft, until it 
reaches the bottom where it comes to rest. 
The “ball and shaft” can be represented as follows. New sorts are introduced 
for velocities, distances and heights, and I will consider only interpretations in 
which these sorts are interpreted by the reals.16 There are four types of event: 
Propel(u), Drop, Bounce and Stop. A Propel(u) event sets the ball in motion with 
velocity u. A Drop event, which occurs when the ball is no longer supported, 
starts the ball falling. A Bounce event, which occurs when the ball hits a vertical 
surface, reverses the ball’s direction of motion. A Stop event occurs when the ball 
comes to rest. The property Moving(u) represents that the ball is moving 
horizontally with velocity u, Fulling represents that the ball is in freefall, 
Distance(d) represents that the ball is distance d from its starting point which is 
assumed to be 0, and Height(h) represents that the ball is at height h. The 
horizontal surface is assumed to be at height 0. The near wall of the shaft is at 
distance A, the far wall is at distance B and the bottom is at height C. I will 
consider only interpretations in which the arithmetic functions have their usual 
meanings. 
Znitiutes(Propel(u),Moving(u),s) . 
Trujectory(Moving(u),s,Distunce(d),u) + d = u*u . 
(D4.1) 
(D4.2) 
Triggers(s) Drop) t 
ZZoldsZn(Distunce(d),s) A d = A A 
Hol&Zn(Moving(u),s) A u > 0 . 
Znitiutes(Drop , Fulling,s) . 
Trujectory(Fulling,s,Height(h),u) + h = -4.9*u2 . 
(D4.3) 
(D4.4) 
(D4.5) 
Triggers(s,Bounce) t 
iYohz!sZn(Distunce(d),s) A HoldsZn(Moving(u),s) A 
[d=B A u>o] v [d=A A u<o]. (D4.6) 
I6 The set of fluents is now as large as the reals. However, note that axioms (Sl)-(S3) only insist on 
the existence of states with finitely many fluents. In practice, only states with finitely many fluents will 
usually arise. 
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Initiates(Bounce,Moving(u2),s) +- 
HoldsZn(Moving(u,),s) A u, = -u2 
Terminates(Bounce,Moving(u),s) 
Triggers(s,Stop) + 
(D4.7) 
(D4.8) 
Holdsin(Height(h),s) A h = C A HoldsIn(Falling,s) . (D4.9) 
Terminates(Stop,Moving(u),s) . (D4.10) 
Terminates(Stop,Falling,s) (D4.11) 
Eleven domain axioms are required, as in Sandewall’s formulation [29]. Their 
conjunction along with the requisite uniqueness-of-names axioms will be denoted 
by D,. Now consider the following event. 
Huppens(Propel( 5) .O) (H4.1) 
Proposition 11. 
CZK’,,,[EC A D, A (H4.1)] k 3t [Happens(Stop,t) A f >O] 
In other words, the ball eventually reaches the bottom of the shaft. 
Proof. Let x be the conjunction of EC without (E3) and (E4) with D, A 
(H4.1). The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5. Applying Theorem 4 
then Theorem 3 to x yields the completions of the predicates minimised by 
CZRC,,, Then, since (E3) and (E4) are still chronological with the new 
definitions, Theorem 10 can be applied, first to add (E3) to x then to add (E4), to 
show that these completions are true in all models of CZRC,,,[EC A D, A 
(H4.1)]. There are no domain constraints, so CZRC,,, yields (3) as in the proof of 
Proposition 5. It is straightforward to show classically from these completions and 
the event calculus axioms that the proposition is true. 0 
The same example is formalised by Sandewall [29] using a form of chronologi- 
cal minimisation extended to cope with continuous change, in which discon- 
tinuities are postponed until as late as possible. Sandewall’s formulation, although 
it has the same number of axioms, is more concise. It uses temporal modalities 
and doesn’t introduce events where there are discontinuities. It is arguable 
whether this succinctness is achieved at the expense of expressive power. Indeed, 
when Sandewall does try to combine reasoning about action with reasoning about 
continuous change, a much more complex formalisation results [30]. One 
drawback to chronological minimisation, as noted by Kautz [lo], is that it does 
not cope well with explanation problems. However, Sandewall has recently 
attempted to address this problem [31,32]. A more thorough comparison of 
Sandewall’s approach with that presented here would be useful. 
M. Shanahan I Artificial Intelligence 77 (1995) 249-284 273 
11. Concluding remarks 
Arguably, the most pleasing solutions to default reasoning problems are 
modular. First, we represent in classical, monotonic logic what we know about the 
world-the propositions of which we are certain and from which we can draw 
definite conclusions. Then, we formalise the apparatus for jumping to reasonable, 
but defeasible, conclusions whose validity we cannot absolutely guarantee. The 
solution presented in this paper does not seem to conform to this ideal, since 
states were introduced into the ontology solely to facilitate the formalisation of 
default persistence by allowing domain and history formulae to be safely 
circumscribed separately from the axioms of the event calculus. It is tempting to 
conclude that there is a flaw in the solution, since it has forced the ontology of the 
formalism. On the other hand, it could be argued that the exercise of formalising 
default persistence has simply brought to light the desirability, independently of 
the need for default persistence, of an ontology which includes states. 
This paper does not address the issue of explanation, that is reasoning from 
effects to causes. A number of temporal reasoning problems have an explanation 
component, such as the bloodless variation of the Yale shooting scenario (in 
which the victim is alive after the shot has been fired), and Kautz’s stolen car 
problem [lo]. In terms of the circumscriptive event calculus, a HoldsAt fact might 
be given, demanding an explanation in terms of Happens formulae. This 
conforms to a representational principle underlying the event calculus-that 
properties hold because events initiate them, whilst events themselves are “first 
causes”. 
There are two approaches to explanation with the event calculus: deductive and 
abductive. In the deductive approach, HoldsAt facts requiring explanation are 
conjoined with the domain, history and event calculus formulae, and explanations 
are expected to be among the logical consequences. This approach, using other 
formalisms, is common in the literature (Morgenstern and Stein [26], Lifschitz 
and Rabinov [17], Baker [l, 21). In the abductive approach, which is less common 
(Shanahan [34,35]), explanations are Happens formulae which, when conjoined 
with the domain and history formulae and event calculus axioms, yield the facts to 
be explained as logical consequences. 
The abductive approach seems to fit better the above-mentioned representa- 
tional principle. Furthermore, no extra representation apparatus is required to 
solve explanation problems using abduction. Only the reasoning mode changes. 
The deductive approach to explanation, on the other hand, violates the conditions 
for applying Theorems 2 and 10. If extra HoldsAt formulae are conjoined to 
axiom (E4), the results of minimisation become unpredictable. 
An interesting topic for further research is the relationship between the calculus 
of events presented here and the situation calculus of McCarthy and Hayes [23]. 
The two formalisms can be compared with respect to their ontologies, the set of 
basic relations they represent, and their treatment of persistence. I will briefly 
discuss each of these in turn. The ontologies of the two formalisms are similar- 
both include properties (or fluents) and event types (or actions). The event 
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calculus also includes states-which strongly resemble situations-and time 
points, which features in McCarthy and Hayes’ 1969 paper, although they have 
rarely been employed in subsequent work using the situation calculus (but see 
Miller and Shanahan [25]). 
One of the main motivations of this paper was to extend approaches to the 
frame problem to deal with continuous change, a subject which has been almost 
entirely neglected in the situation calculus literature. It is not clear, at first glance, 
that the ontology of the situation calculus is adequate for representing continuous 
change, since it is centered on instantaneous napshots of the world which are 
organised into a tree structure via the Result function. Gelfond et al. [6] argue 
that continuous change could be represented in the situation calculus through the 
introduction of infinitely divisible actions. Unfortunately, they do not explore this 
suggestion very far. It is particularly difficult to see how triggered events, which 
are needed to represent all but the simplest examples of continuous change, could 
be captured with an ontology that lacks real-valued narrative time. 
How do the basic relations represented in the event calculus compare with 
those in the situation calculus? The event calculus relates properties to time 
points, whilst the situation calculus relates them to situations. Since situations are 
hypothetical whilst time points are actual, this leads to an emphasis in the event 
calculus on an actual narrative of events, whilst the situation calculus concentrates 
on hypothetical sequences of events. However, the event calculus of this paper 
includes states, which are hypothetical ike situations, so there is no fundamental 
reason why it could not match the situation calculus in representing hypothetical 
sequences of events. Similarly, the situation calculus can incorporate predicates 
which distinguish actual from hypothetical situations (Pinto and Reiter [27]), or 
which map situations onto a narrative time line (Miller and Shanahan [25]). So, 
with respect to their ontologies and the basic relations they represent, it seems to 
be possible to extend both formalisms until they merge into each other. 
Perhaps the most significant difference between the two formalisms is in the 
treatment of persistence. Frame axioms in the situation calculus literature usually 
relate the properties which hold in a situation to those which hold in the 
preceding situation, whilst the event calculus persistence axiom (E3) relates the 
properties which hold at a time point to earlier events. This has two important 
consequences. First, situation calculus frame axioms are usually bidirectional- 
persistence works backwards as well as forwards. Persistence in the event calculus 
works forwards only.17 Second, properties only persist in the event calculus if they 
are initiated by events. Other properties are not “caught” by the persistence 
axiom. In the situation calculus literature, however, the frame axiom usually 
applies to all fluents, although in Lifschitz [14, 1.51 its application is restricted to a 
subset of the fluents known as the frame fluents. 
Hopefully further insight into the relationship between the two formalisms can 
be gained in the future. Ultimately, what we would like to develop is a deeper 
“This was not true in the original event calculus of Kowalski and Sergot [ll] 
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understanding of the space of possible formalisms for representing change. Such 
an understanding would map out the possible ontologies, sets of basic relations, 
and approaches to persistence, and would highlight the implications of each 
choice. In the light of such an understanding, the apparent boundaries between 
particular formalisms would disappear altogether. 
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 2 
First we have some preliminary definitions. 
Definition A.1 A J-indexed set S is a set, every member of which is associated 
with exactly one element of the set J (its index). I will write Sj to denote the set of 
all s ES such that j is the index of s. 
Consider a many-sorted language 2 of first-order predicate calculus with a set 
Y of sorts, an Y’* x y-indexed set 9 of function symbols and an Y*-indexed set 
9’ of predicate symbols.” 
Definition A.2. A pre-interpretation of 2 is a pair (9,Fn), where 9 is an 
y-indexed set of objects, and for every n-ary function f E ss,,.,.,,,,,, Fn(f) is a 
mapping from 9,, x . f - X LSsds, to gs. 
Definition A.3. A partiaf interpretation of 2 is a pair (( 9, Fn),Pr), where 
(9,Fn) is a pre-interpretation of 2, and for every n-ary predicate P E 9’s,,...,Sn, 
Pr(P) is a partial mapping from gs, x * * * x LBSn to TRUE or FALSE. 
Definition A.4. An interpretation of 23 is a partial interpretation (Zp,Pr) of 2 
such that for every predicate P E 9, Pr(P) is a total mapping. 
Definition AS. A model of a formula +b of language 2 is an interpretation of 2? in 
which I,!J is true, where truth in an interpretation is defined in terms of Pr and Fn 
in the standard way for predicate calculus. 
IRY* is the set of all finite tuples of elements of 9’. 
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Definition A.6. If (Zp,Pr, ) is a partial interpretation of .Y and (Zp,Pr,) is an 
interpretation of 2, then (Zp,Pr,) fills out (Zp,Pr, ) for 9 if for all P E 9 s,,,,,. s, 
and for all X, E gS,, Pr,(P)(X,, . . , X,) = V implies Pr,(P)(X,, , X,) = V. 
Definition A.7. A formula of Y has the truth value TRUE in a partial interpreta- 
tion Z of 2 if it is true in every interpretation that fills out Z for 9, and has the 
truth value FALSE in Z is it is false in every interpretation that fills out Z for 2. 
Otherwise. its truth value is not defined in I. 
Definition A.8. The n-ary predicate P E 9,,,, ,,,,, is uninterpreted in a partial 
interpretation I of 9 if for all X, E gSd,, , the truth value of P(X, , . , X,) is not 
defined in 1. Conversely, the predicate P is fully interpreted in Z if for all X, E &BS,, 
the truth value of P(X,, . , X,,) is defined in 1. 
Now let the set Y of sorts include the sorts s,, . , s,, . . . , s,, where S, is the 
sort of time points. Let the set 9’ of predicates include < E PS:,,,Y, and q E 
9 5 ,..... 5,. Am’ Consider only interpretations of 2 in which the time points are 
interpreted by the natural numbers, that is 63, = N, and in which < has its usual 
meaning. Let Zp = (9,Fn) be a pre-interpretation of 22. Let (Zp,Pr) be a partial 
interpretation of 2 in which q is uninterpreted, but in which every other 
predicate in 9’ is fully interpreted. Finally, let 
of 2 which is chronological in argument t. 
Definition A.9. A q-map is a partial mapping 
FALSE. 
I,!J = Vx q(x) +-+ 4(x) be a formula 
from 6SS, X . . . x %,vm to TRUE or 
A q-map can be used to extend an interpretation in which q is uninterpreted to 
one in which it is fully interpreted. 
Definition A.lO. A q-map M is total below T E N if for all X, E 63, where X, < T, 
M(X,. . . . ,X,) is defined. 
The proof of the theorem relies on several lemmas, which I will now prove. 
Definition A.ll. Let M be a q-map and P E 9 be an n-ary predicate. The 
function 63 is defined as follows. 
(Pr@W(P) = (z(p), if P is q . otherwise . 
Lemma A.12. For any T E N, and any q-map M which is total below T, for all 
X, E gs, where X, s T, the truth value of 4(X,, . . . , X,,,) is defined in 
(Zp,Pr@M). 
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Proof. Since $ is chronological, the only occurrences of q in 4(X,, . . . , X,) are 
in conjunctions of the form q(Z,, . . .,Z,) A Z,<X,.IfMistotalbelow Tand 
X, G T, then the truth value of q(Z,, . . . , X,) A 2, <Xc is defined in 
(Zp,Z’r@M). Consequently, the truth value of 4(X,, . . . , X,) is defined in 
(Zp,Pr Cl3 M) , because Pr CD M is a total mapping for all predicates occurring in 4 
apart from q. 0 
Definition A.13. The q-map M, is defined for any (Y E N as follows. 
MJX,, . . . ,X,1 
1 
V, ifcw>Oand4(X,,.. . ,X,J has truth value V 
= in (Zp,Pr@M,_,) , 
undefined, otherwise . 
Note that MO is undefined everywhere. The mapping M, will facilitate the 
definition of a q-map that extends a partial interpretation in which q is 
uninterpreted to a model of the chronological formula r,k First I will prove some 
properties of M, which will be required later. 
Lemma A.14 For any (Y E N, M, is total below a. 
Proof. The proof is by induction. Clearly the proposition is true for the base case 
where (Y is 0. For the inductive case, consider any Z3 and suppose that MO is total 
below p. Then from Lemma A.12, for all Xi E gsi where X, <p, the truth value 
of+(Xr,..., X,) is defined in (Zp,Pr@ MO). So from Definition A.15, M,,, is 
total below p + 1. 0 
Lemma A.15 For any (Y E N and all Xi E gx,, if M,(X, , . . . , X,,,) = V then 
Mm+l(X,, . . . ,X,,J=V. 
Proof. The proof is by induction. Clearly the proposition is true for the base case 
where (Y is 0. For the inductive case, consider any ~3, and suppose that for all 
X~~~~~,ifM,(X,,...,X,)=VthenM~+,(X,,...,X,)=V.Fromthishypoth- 
esis, for all Xi E gsi, if the truth value of 4(X,, . . . ,X,,,) is defined in 
(Zp,PrCBM,), then it has the same truth value in (Zp,PrG3Mp+1). Therefore, 
. . 
from Defimtron A. 13 tf MD + I(XI, . . . , X,)=VthenMP+z(X1,...,X,)=V. q 
Note that Lemma A.15 doesn’t imply that M, is the same as M,,, , because M, 
is only a partial interpretation. 
Lemma A.M. For any cy E N, and all Xi E Bs, where X, < (Y, if q(X,, . . . , X,) has 
truth value V in (ZP,Pr 03 M, ) then 4(X,, . . . , X,) has truth value V in 
(Zp,Pr@M,). 
Proof. Clearly, if 4(X,, . . . ,X,J has truth value V in (Zp,Pr @ M, ) then 
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M,(Xi, . . . , X,,) = V, because q is uninterpreted in (@Jr). But if 
M,(X, 1 . . , X,,,) = V then, from Definition A.13, 4(X,, . ,X,) has truth value 
V in (Zp,Pr $ M, ~, ) Therefore, from Lemma A. 15, 4(X,, . . X,,) has truth 
value V in (Zp,Pr CT3 Mcy ) Ll 
Definition A.17. The q-map M,,, is defined as follows. 
WJ(X,, . .,X,,)=V. 
if there is some (Y E F+J such that M,(X, , . . , X,,,) = V. 
Lemma A.15 ensures that MU is a well-defined function. The mapping M, 
extends a partial interpretation in which q is uninterpreted to a model of the 
chronological formula I,!J, as I will now show. 
Lemma A.18. M, is a total mapping from 9,, x . . . X a,,,, to TRUE or FALSE. 
Proof. Consider any T E W. From Lemma A. 14, M,,, is total below T + 1. That 
is, for all X, E 9,, where X, G T. M,, , (X,. . , X,) is defined. From Definition 
A.17, for all X, E GJ5,. if M,+,(X,. . .X,,,) is defined then M,(X,, . . ,X,) is 
defined. Therefore Mw is a total mapping from 9,, , X . . . X 9s,,, to TRUE or 
FALSE. 0 
Lemma A.19. For all X E 9 
(Ip,PrC%MM,) then 4(X,. f . .ii,‘) ~~s~r%z’~~~ub 
X ) has truth value V in 
tin (Zp,Pr$Mw). 
Proof. Since q in uninterpreted in (Zp,Pr), if q(X,, . , X,) has truth value V in 
(Zp,Pr@M,) then Mw(X,. , X,,,) = V. From Definition A.17, this implies that 
there is some (Y such that M,,(X,, , X,,,) = V. Then from Definition A.11 and 
Lemma A.16, 4(X,, . X,,) has truth value V in (Zp,Pr 63 M, ) . From Defini- 
tions A.11 and A.17, this implies that 4(X,, . . ,X,,) has truth value V in 
(Zp,Pr@M,). Cl 
Lemma A.20. (Zp,Pr 63 MU ) is an interpretation of 60. 
Proof. From Lemma A.18, M, is a total mapping for q. Therefore, since Pr(P) is 
a total mapping for every predicate P E 9’ except q, (Pr@ Mm)(P) is a total 
mapping for every predicate P E 9’. 0 
Lemma A.21. (Zp,Pr Q3 M, ) is II model of Ic, = Vx q(x) ++ 4(x). 
Proof. The proposition follows directly from Lemmas A.19 and A.20. 0 
Now, I can show that circumscribing the conjunction of a formula with a 
chronological formula is easy, under the right conditions. Let 9 be the same 
language as g, but without the predicate q. Let X be a formula of _Y. Note that 
M. Shanahan I Artificial Intelligence 77 (1995) 249-284 279 
since (Zp,Pr) is a partial interpretation of 9, it is also a partial interpretation of 
Ze-, and recall that q is uninterpreted in (Zp,Pr) . 
Lemma A.22. Zf (Zp,Pr ) is a model of ,y, then (Zp,Pr 03 M,,, ) is a model of 
x A *. 
Proof. From Lemma A.21, (Zp,Pr$M,) is a model of 4. If (Zp,Pr) is a model 
of x then, since x doesn’t mention q, (Zp,Pr@M,) is also a model of x. 0 
Let P* and Q* be subsets of 9 such that Q* includes q. 
Lemma A.23. All models of CZRC[x A + ; P* ; Q*] have the form (Zp,Pr’@M) 
where (Zp,Pr’) is a model of CZRC[x ; P* ; Q*], and M is a q-map. 
Proof. Any model (Zp,Pr”) of CZRC[x A I$ ; P* ; Q*] can be written in the form 
(Zp,Pr’@M), where M is the q-map Pr”(q), q is uninterpreted in (Zp,Pr’), and 
Pr’(P) is Pr”(P) for every predicate P E 9 except q. Then it remains to show that 
(Zp,Pr’) is a model of CZRC[x ; P* ; Q*]. 
Suppose (Zp,Pr’) is not a model of CZRC[x ; P* ; Q*]. Clearly (Zp,Pr’) is a 
model of x, since (Zp,Pr’@M) is a model of x and M interprets only q which 
isn’t mentioned in x. So there must be some model (Zp,Pr”‘) of x which is smaller 
in P*, with Q* allowed to vary, than (Zp,Pr’). Then, from Lemma A.22, 
(Zp,Pr”‘@ M,) is a model of x A I). With q allowed to vary, (Zp,Pr”‘@ M,) must 
be smaller in P* than (Zp,Pr’@ M), because (Pr”‘@ M,)(P) = Pr”‘(P) for every 
predicate P E 9’ except q. Therefore (Zp,Pr’$ M) is not a model of CZRC[x A 
$ ; P* ; Q*], which is a contradiction. 0 
Lemma A.24 Every formula which is true in all models of CZRC[x ; P* ; Q*] is 
also true in all models of CZRC[x A $ ; P* ; Q*]. 
Proof. Consider any model of CZRC[x A JI ; P* ; Q*]. From Lemma A.23, it 
has the form (Zp,Pr’@M) where (Zp,Pr’) is a model of CZRC[x ; P* ; Q*], and 
M is a q-map. The theorem then follows from the fact that any formula which is 
true in (Zp,Pr’) is also true in (Zp,Pr’@ M). q 
Theorem 2 follows from directly from Lemma A.24. 
Appendix B. Temporal projection algorithms 
Theorem B.4 presented here, facilitates the construction of algorithms for 
temporal projection. Recall Definitions A. 1-A. 11 and the corresponding assump- 
tions from Appendix A. 
Definition B.l. The q-map C, is defined for any (Y E N as follows. 
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V, if (Y > 0, and for all models (Zp,Pr’) 
C,(X,,. . ,x,,,>= 
of CZRC[X ; P* ; Q*], $(X,. . . ,X,) 
has truth value V in (Zp,Pr’@ C,_,) , 
undefined. otherwise 
Lemma B.2. For any (Y E N and for all X, E 9 s,, if C,(X,. . , X,) = V then 
q(X,, . . . , X,,,) has truth value V in all models of CZRC[x A Cc, ; P* ; Q*]. 
Proof. The proof is by induction. The proposition is trivially true for the base 
case where (Y = 0. Consider any p. Suppose CP(X,, . , X,) = V implies 
q(X, , . . . , X,,) has truth value V in all models of CZRC[x A II, ; P* ; Q*]. 
From Definition B. 1, C,, , (X, , . X,,,) = V implies 4(X,. . , X,,,) has truth 
value V in every partial interpretation of the form (Zp,Pr’ $ CO), where (Zp,Pr’) 
is a model of CZRC[x ; P* ; Q*], which by definition means it has truth value V in 
every interpretation that fills out such a partial interpretation. But every model of 
CZRC[x A 9 ; P* ; Q*] fills out such a partial interpretation (see below), so 
4(X,, . . . ,X,,) has truth value V in all models of CZRC[x A + ; P” ; Q*]. If 
4(X,, . . . , X,,,) has truth value V in all models of CZRC[x A I/J ; P* ; Q*] then 
so does q(X,, . . . X,,,). 
To see that every model of CZRC[x A 4 ; P* ; Q*] fills out a partial interpreta- 
tion of the form (Zp, Pr’ G3 C, ) , where (Zp,Pr’) is a model of CZRC[x ; P* ; Q*], 
recall Lemma A.23. From Lemma A.23, every model of CZRC[x A I) ; P* ; Q*] 
has the form (Zp,Pr’$M) where (Zp,Pr’) is a model of CZRC[x ; P’ ; Q*] and 
M is a q-map. From the induction hypothesis, C,(X,, . . . . X,) = V implies 
M(X,, . ,X,,,)=V. So (Zp.Pr’$M) fills out (Zp,Pr’@CC,). 0 
Lemma B.3. For any cy E N. Cct is total below (Y. 
Proof. The proof is the same as for Lemma A.14. 0 
Theorem B.4. For any LY EN and all X, E gshJ, where X,C CY, CZRC[x A 
4~ ; P* ; Q*] b q(X, . , X,,,) if’ and only if C,(X, , . , X,,,) = TRUE. 
Proof. The lemma follows directly from Lemmas B.2 and B.3. 0 
Theorem B.4 facilitates the construction of algorithms for deciding whether 
q(X,, , X,,,) is true (or false) in all models of CZRC[x A $ ;P* ; Q*], given 
any X, E 9*,. Let cy be X,. An algorithm built according to the following schema 
will compute the set S, of all tuples (Y,, . . , Y,,,) such that C,(Y,, . . . , Y,,,) = 
TRUE, and the set S, of all tuples (Y,, . . , Y,) such that C,(Y,, . . , Y,) = 
FALSE. From Theorem B.4, to check whether q(X,, . , X,) is true (or false) in 
all models of CZRC[x A I) ; P* ; Q*], it is simply necessary to check for 
membership of S, (or S,). 
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SE.:={ >, 
f&J:={ 1, 
FOR Y,:=O TO (Y 
S,:=S&J{(Y* )...) Y,)ITRUE(Y, )...) Y,)} 
S, := S, U { ( Yl, . . . , Y,) 1 FALSE(Y,, . . . , Y,)} . 
TRUE(Y,, . . . , Y,) is shorthand for “+(Y,, . . . , Y,) is true in all models of 
CZRC[x ; P* ; Q*]“, and FALSE(Y,, . . . , Y,) is shorthand for “+(Y,, . . . , Y,) 
is false in all models of CZRC[x ; P* ; Q*]“. Another algorithm is required for 
computing the sets 
WI? *. ., Yn) 1 TRUE(Y,, . . . , Y,,J> 
and 
WI,. *. , Y,) 1 f’A~!=(y,, . d . , Y,J> 
at each iteration. The details of this second algorithm depend on ,y and 4, but it 
can exploit the fact that all occurrences of q in 4(Y,, . . . , Y,) are in conjunctions 
of the form q(Z,, . . . , Z,,,) A Z, < Y,. On any given iteration of the algorithm, a 
conjunction of that form is true in all models of CZRC[,y ; P* ; Q*] if and only if 
(Z,, . . .,Z,)~S,,andisfalseifandonlyif (Z,,...,Z,)ES,.Inthecaseof 
(E3), since the definitions of Initiated and Terminated are clausal, resolution 
theorem proving techniques could be used to compute the required sets, and 
negation-as-failure could be used to minimise Horn clause fragments of the 
domain and history formulae. 
There is nothing surprising about this algorithm schema, of course. It simply 
works forwards in time in the way we might expect. The purpose of Theorem B.4 
is to endorse the use of the obvious algorithm. Effectively, Theorem B.4 allows us 
to forget about 9 computationally, in the same way that Theorems 2 and 10 allow 
us to forget about it from the point of view of minimisation. 
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 10 
Consider the same language 9 as in Appendix A. Consider only interpretations 
of 2 in which time points are interpreted by the reals, that is 9st = R, and in 
which < has its usual meaning for real numbers. Let $ = VX q(x) - 4(x) be a 
formula of 9 which is real-chronological in argument t with respect to a formula x 
of 9 and a marker set S. Let Zp = (9,Fn) be a pre-interpretation of 9. Let 
(Zp,Pr) be a partial interpretation of 2 in which q is uninterpreted, but in which 
every other predicate in 9 is fully interpreted. Recall the definitions of a q-map, 
of M,, and of M, from Appendix A. 
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Definition C.l. A q-map M is total up to T E Iw if for all Xi E gsd,, where X, d T, 
M(X,, . , X,,,) is defined. 
Lemma C.2. For any (Y E N where (Y > 0, if S has (Y or more elements then M, is 
total up to any T E 1w such that T c ath element of S. 
Proof. The proof is by induction. Clearly the proposition is true for the base case 
where LY is 1. For the inductive case, consider any p, and suppose that MP is total 
up to any T E IJ! such that T c Pth element of S. Then, from the definition of M,, 
we have to show that for all X, E 9*, where X, < (/3 + l)th element of S, the truth 
value of 4(X,, . ,X,) is defined in (Zp,Pr$M,). 
By hypothesis, 4(X,, . 1 X,) is defined for all Xi E 9,?, where X, G /3th 
element of S. So consider any X, G (p + 1)th element of S such that X, > Pth 
element of S. Now, since I/J is real-chronological, it can be seen that the only 
occurrences of 4 in 4(X,, . . , X,) are in conjunctions of the form q(2) A Z, < 
X, A 0 which are false. To see this, consider 2,. Clearly the conjunction is false 
if Z,> X,. On the other hand, if 2, <X, then, since X, is strictly between the Pth 
and (p + 1)th elements of S, 2, is not in S, and 13 is therefore false from the 
definition of real-chronological. 0 
Lemma C.3. For any (Y E N, if S has fewer than (Y elements then M, is total up to 
any TEIW. 
Proof. From Lemma C.2, n/r, is total up to the last element of S. So, from the 
definition of M,, we have to show that for all Xi E 9Js, where X, > the last 
element of S, the truth value of 4(X,, . , X,) is defined in (Ip,Pr CB M, _, ). 
From the definition of real-chronological, the only occurrences of q in 
4(X,, . . X,,,) are in conjunctions of the form q(z) A 6, where 8 is false if 
X, > the last element of S. Therefore the truth value of 4(X,, . . . , X,) is always 
defined if X, > the last element of S. So 4(X,, . . . ,X,) is defined for any 
xi E 9s , and M, is total up to any T E Iw. q 
The proofs of Lemmas A. 15 and A. 16 are unchanged from Appendix A. 
Lemma C.4. M, is a total mapping from ad,, x . . ’ X gsrn to TRUE or FALSE. 
Proof. It is easy to show that for all X, E Bsl there exists some (Y such that 
M,(X,, . . , X,) is defined. To see this, consider X,. If there is no T E S before 
X,, then M,(X,, . . . , X,) is defined, from Lemma C.3. Otherwise, if there is no 
T E S after X,, then from Lemma C.2, M,(X,, . . . , X,) is defined, where (Y is the 
number of elements in S. Finally, if there is some T E S after or equal to X, and 
some T’ ES before X,, then from Lemma C.2, M,(X,, . . . ,X,) is defined, 
where the smallest T E S after or equal to X, is the ath element of S. The fact 
that S is a marker set ensures that these three cases are exhaustive. From the 
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definition of M,, if 44,(X,, . . . , X,) is defined then &(X1, . . . , X,,,) is defined. 
Therefore M, is a total mapping from gS, x + . . x gsa,m to TRUE or FALSE. Cl 
The rest of the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A, 
yielding Theorem 10 in the same way, but under the assumption that J, is 
real-chronological in some argument with respect to the formula x and some 
marker set. 
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